This paper initiates discussion about the contribution of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth to Indonesia's long-term economic growth. It presents new time series estimates of GDP, capital stock and education-adjusted employment, and offers a growth accounting approach that estimates the contribution of conventional factor inputs to GDP growth during 1880-2007. For most of the period, the growth of employment, educational attainment and particularly capital stock explained almost all of long-term output growth, and TFP growth was marginal. During the key growth periods 1900-29 and 1967-97, TFP growth was on balance negative, respectively marginally positive. However, the contribution of TFP growth was substantial during some sub-periods, particularly 1933-41, 1951-61, 1967-73 and 2000-07. Each of these followed a major economic downturn that slowed capital stock growth and required a more efficient use of productive resources, assisted by changes in economic policy and institutions that enhanced productivity and efficiency.
The sources of long-term economic growth in Indonesia, 1880-2007
Introduction
The broad dimensions of growth and structural change in Indonesia have been established in other publications (Van der Eng 1992 , 2002a ). This paper builds on those results in order to outline possibilities for further research and discussion about Indonesia's growth experience. In particular, this paper initiates discussion about the contribution of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth to Indonesia's long-term economic growth. It presents new time series estimates of GDP, and tentatively explores and employs the data available to gauge long-term changes in capital stock, education-adjusted employment, and factor income shares. Some of these data are tentative, but offer an opportunity to explore the feasibility of growth accounting analysis. After accounting for the contribution of conventional factor inputs to GDP growth, the paper identifies the contribution of TFP.
Identification of the contribution of TFP allows an elaboration of Indonesia's long-term growth experience in the context of literature on the sources of long-term economic growth. In comparison, the data availability for Indonesia only allows a growth accounting approach that yields relatively crude TFP estimates. These cannot necessarily be taken as indications of the contribution made by technological change to long-term economic growth without refinement, as was possible for other countries (see e.g. Abramovitz and David 2001; Prados and Rosés 2007) . Summarising the historical growth accounting literature for particularly the UK, US and other Western countries, Crafts (2004) found consensus that TFP growth since the late 18 th century has actually been quite modest. These findings underline the so-called 'Solow Productivity Paradox', as they contrast sharply with notable evidence of technological change and its impact in these countries, e.g. in the form of steam power in the early-19 th century and information technology in the late-20 th century. The answer to the paradox may lie in the embodiment of new technology in measures of capital stock. The TFP estimates presented in this study will allow reflection on the results of multi-country growth studies that employed similar crude estimates. In the Asian context, a large part of the literature on the economics of macroeconomic growth is dominated by discussion about the degree to which TFP growth explains the 'Asian economic miracle' of high economic growth since the 1960s. Young (1994) argued, on the basis of a 4-country study, that this 'miracle' was more the result of the mobilisation of factors of production (labour and capital) than productivity growthi.e. 'perspiration' rather than 'inspiration', as Krugman (1994) summarised the findings, inciting a series of studies that often used readily available multi-country data sets in order to estimate TFP growth, extending beyond Asia to cover different parts of the world. 2 The multi-country studies that estimated TFP growth all found different, sometimes contradictory results. One of the reasons was that they had to make rather crude estimates of capital input on the basis of available national accounts data. As a major Asian country Indonesia has, of course, been part of the multicountry studies referred to above. Most found positive TFP growth, albeit to varying degrees (see section 4 of this paper). However, there are no reasons to regard the results of these studies as conclusive, as they failed to consider the quality and availability of Indonesian statistical data explicitly. Close scrutiny of the data from these multi-country studies also reveals inexplicable discrepancies with the original data produced at the Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS), Indonesia's statistical agency, and its predecessors. Moreover, studies using multi-country data sets took national accounts data for granted. They did not account for revisions in these data over time, while their capital stock estimates often depended on rough assumptions, such as depreciation or lifetime of different categories of productive assets. Consequently, estimates of gross fixed capital formation and capital stock, for example, deviate significantly from estimates that take close account of the idiosyncrasies in Indonesia's statistical data and the composition of investment and capital stock (Van der Eng 2008b).
Indonesia's long-term economic growth has been the subject of several studies (e.g. Booth 1998; Dick 2002) and its recent growth experience in recent decades has been the subject of even closer scrutiny (e.g. Hill 1999) . However, these studies did not employ growth accounting as a tool of analysis and focused on the ultimate reasons for Indonesia's development in terms of changes in institutions and economic policies conducive to economic growth. Consequently, the proximate causes remain unclear, even though they underlie the country's economic growth experience and offer pointers to the periodisation of the long-term growth experience as well as the relative relevance of ultimate explanations. This paper seeks to resolve these inconsistent findings in the literature. It follows an approach used by Sigit (2004) , but enhances it on the basis of new longterm estimates of GDP in 2000 prices, new long-term estimates of capital stock in Indonesia in 2000 constant prices, estimates of the share of labour income, new estimates of education-adjusted employment, and an extension of the timeframe of analysis. The next section outlines the methodology and data used in the paper, while section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 estimates the 'proximate' sources of economic growth in Indonesia. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology of estimating TFP
This paper uses a simple, direct accounting method to estimate the contribution of TFP growth to economic growth. The production function in equation (1) indicates that output during a given year is a function of the productive employment of the total stocks of capital and labour.
( )
Where Q t = real output, K t = capital stock and L t = employment in year t, and A t is the efficiency term. Differentiating with respect to time yields equation 2.
Dividing both sides by Q t yields equation 3.
Replacing the marginal productivities by factor prices then gives equation 4. 
Any effort to incorporate a measure of quality changes in the stock of capital goods, akin to e.g. Maddison (1987: 663-664) , is arbitrary, particularly given the paucity of detailed long-term investment data for Indonesia. However, it is possible to incorporate a measure of quality changes in the stock of employment by adjusting it for educational attainment in a way shown by equation 6. 
Thus, the key data required to estimate the contribution of TFP to economic growth are annual data on GDP and capital stock in constant prices, education-adjusted employment, and the labour income share in GDP. Since this paper is concerned with the national economy of Indonesia, it uses nation-wide data.
Estimation of output and inputs

Output data
Indonesia's official national accounts data underwent at least six major revisions since the 1950s. These were in part due to the adoption of new estimation procedures, improved estimation procedures, improved coverage of estimation, and changes in the base-year for constant price estimates (see Van der Eng 1999 , 2005 . Since the 1983 revision, Indonesia's national accounts have been anchored on the quinquennial Input-Output (I-O) Tables. Consequently, the output approach still offers the main substantiation of the country's national accounts. The last of these revisions was anchored on the 2000 I-O Table. For the purpose of this paper, the new national accounts data for 2000-07 were extrapolated back in time with 1983-2000 national accounts data and with broad indicators of economic activity for 1880-1983, following a methodology established in Van der Eng (1992 , 2002a . This yields a GDP series in constant 2000 prices that is shown in per capita terms in Figure 1 . The chart confirms that the 1951-82 national accounts data were underestimated. The chart shows that Indonesia experienced periods of economic expansion, particularly sustained periods of growth during 1900-29 and 1967-97. In the latter period, average GDP growth was a significant 6.9% per year and annual GDP per capita growth was 4.8%. Indonesia's economy contracted drastically in 1998, but growth resumed in 1999 and the 1997 level of GDP per capita was re-achieved in 2004.
Capital stock data
Closely scrutinised estimates of capital stock in Indonesia are rare. Recent estimates disaggregate the growth of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) on the basis of the quinquennial I-O Tables (Van der Eng 2008b). A perpetual inventory method was applied to 28 categories of productive assets since 1951, with the longest asset lifetime of 40 years, to estimate Gross Fixed Capital Stock (GFCS). The first 'complete' estimate is for 1990. GFCS was then re-estimated back to 1950 with the annual data on GFCF and assumed rates of asset retirement that were based on average implicit rates of asset retirement in the early 1990s. Only non-residential GFCS was used here.
For the purpose of this paper, estimates of non-residential GFCS were made for 1880-1941. These were based on estimates of total GFCF during these years, which were obtained as follows. In 1938, the value of GFCF was ƒ272 million, or 8.1% of GDP (CBS 1948) .
3 GFCF in 1938 was extrapolated for 1880-1941 with total imports of all capital goods and cement in current prices. 4 The underlying assumption is that imported goods used for investment purposes had the same share in GFCF, or 32.5%. 5 GDP in current prices was calculated from Polak (1943) as NDP plus an assumed annual 6.5% depreciation rate for 1921-39, which is close to the 5.9% rate for 1938 (CBS 1948) . This series was extrapolated for 1880-1941 by linking the 1921-39 series to a 'reflated GDP' series, using constant price GDP estimates in Table  A .1 and a 'reflator' from Van der Eng (2002a: 168-73) . Total GDP in 2000 prices in Table A .1 was then multiplied by the resulting ratio of GFCF and GDP in current prices to yield GFCF in constant prices during 1880-1941.
To estimate non-residential GFCS, a perpetual inventory approach was used, assuming the average productive life of all capital goods to have been 26 years, which is the implicit weighted annual average age of 27 items of non-residential capital goods in GFCS during the 1950s (Van der Eng 2008b). It is also assumed that repairs and maintenance allowed successive vintages of a capital good to deliver the same services and that scrapping only took place at the end of the service life of a capital good. Hence, the first complete estimate of capital stock was for 1906 . For 1880 -1905 That is, ƒ42 million investment by Indonesian firms and f225 million by foreign-owned firms (CBS 1948) . ƒ5 million was added as government investment in public infrastructure in 1938 (CEI3 1977 . The total of ƒ272 million was considerably higher than the ƒ89 million total investment by Dutchowned companies and by the central government in fixed assets included in the annual investment series mentioned in CEI3 (1977) for 1938. The discrepancy is due to the fact that the CEI3 data do not include investment by non-Dutch-owned firms, particularly by registered and unregistered ventures that by 1957 were Indonesian-owned, including important investments in farm agriculture. 4 In particular, wood and timber, cement, building glass, industrial and commercial machinery, engines, electrical equipment, railway equipment, ships, and motor vehicles. It may be possible to refine this approach on the basis of more detailed and consistent trade data (values and quantities). 5 The same method was used in the national accounts during the 1950s. E.g. for 1951-55 imported capital goods were on average 25-30% of GFCF (NPB 1957: 622) . constant capital-output ratio (COR) of 0.6 was assumed. This is a low but credible ratio for a still largely agrarian economy as Indonesia's prior to 1906. 6 Figure 2 shows the results of the estimation of GFCS as a Capital-Output Ratio (COR). The COR increased significantly from 0.6 in 1905 to 1.3 in 1929, increasing further to 1.6 in 1932 due to negative GDP growth while GFCF decreased. The COR decreased significantly from 1.3 in 1941 to 1.6 in 1950, the first year after Indonesia's full independence. This reflects the decrease in GFCS during the 1940s, as a consequence of Dutch 'scorched earth' tactics during the Japanese advance into Indonesia in early 1942, the dismantling of industrial assets and railways during the Japanese occupation of 1942-45, and damage sustained during the war of independence 1945-49 (Keppy 2006: 61-67) . 7 The increase in the COR across the 1940s also reflects the fact that the 1941 level of GDP was not re-achieved until 1954. During 1950-67, new GFCF of on average 8% of GDP was just sufficient to recover capital stock, but for several years insufficient to compensate for the retirement of capital goods and prevent a decrease in the COR, as Figure 2 shows. The decline continued until the rate of GFCF increased significantly in the 1970s and stopped the decrease in the COR, and accelerated further during the 1980s and 1990s, yielding an increase in the COR. The stagnation of the COR during the 1970s until the early-1980s, despite an acceleration of GDP growth during the same years, suggests that the main sources of high economic growth during these years were capitalextensive. This may be related to the fact that natural resource exploitation, particularly the rapid growth of oil production for export, underlies much of the economic expansion during these years, in combination with the mobilisation of labour for new jobs in agriculture and industry. The ratio increased significantly during 1980-97, indicating that economic growth during 1980-97 was of a more capital-absorbing nature and depended, at least partly, on the mobilisation of productive capital. This is related to the significant growth of export-oriented manufacturing industry since the early-1980s.
Employment data
Consistent long-term estimates of employment in Indonesia are hampered by the fact that only the population censuses of 1930, 1961, 1971, 1980, 1990 and 2000 are key sources of data, even though the definitions of employment in each are slightly different. These census results have been used to extrapolate the data of the National Labour Force Survey (Survei Angkatan Kerja Nasional, Sakernas), which was conducted for 1976-80, 1982 and 1985-2007 . The Sakernas definitions of employment also differ slightly over the years (Sigit 2000a: 28-29) . Figure 3 shows the interpolated employment data from the population censuses and also the Sakernas data. The interpolations and the Sakernas data track each other closely until 2000. The deviation in total employment in 2000 is possibly caused by the change in the definition of employment in Sakernas to exclude 10-14 year old workers, starting in 1998 (Sigit 2000a: 8) . Many 10-14 year olds remained gainfully employed in Indonesia, comprising 3.7%, 2.9% and 2.9% of employment in 1980, 1990 and 2000 respectively, according to population census data. The interpolated census data are extrapolated backwards from 1930, taking account of population growth 10 years previously, reflecting the assumption that people long started gainful -but most likely part-time -employment at the age of 10.
Educational attainment data
To augment the labour force data, this paper uses an indicator of per capita educational attainment in Indonesia, shown in Figure 4 . It is an approximation of long-term changes based on annual enrolments in institutions for primary, secondary and tertiary education. Figure 4 shows that the results closely track similar data from the postwar population censuses and inter-census estimates, which suggests that they approximate the trend. Improvement in human capital was obviously a gradual process. Educational attainment grew at a very significant rate of 3.9 per cent per year during 1929-67 and 3.2 per cent during 1967-2005, but of course from low levels. Until the 1940s, the gains were mainly due to the expansion of primary education. The share of secondary education increased after 1970, possibly in reaction to labour market changes that increased where the demand for educated workers. As the method used to estimate educational attainment in Figure 4 does not allow a disaggregation of educational attainment by age groups, the paper uses per capita educational attainment as a proxy for the educational attainment per person gainfully employed.
Data on the output elasticity of educational attainment are not available. However, Sakernas contains wage income data that are disaggregated by the highest form of education that employees completed. As the number of years for each form of education is known, it is possible to estimate the income elasticity of each additional year of education. For the years 1989-99, the income elasticity of educational attainment was a fairly constant 0.11, meaning that each additional year of education on average yields an 11% increase of income. This number is taken as a proxy for the elasticity of output with respect to education for the entire period. This is in line with Collins and Bosworth (1996: 152) who found an East-Asia average of 10.7%.
Factor income share data
Although efforts are underway to estimate national income in Indonesia from the income side of the economy (Saleh and Jammal 2002), Indonesia's national accounts do not yet offer such estimates. The main sources on labour and non-labour income are the quinquennial I-O Tables and Indonesia's System of Economic and Social Accounting Matrices and Extension (SESAME) that use the I-O tables as their 'anchor' (Keuning and Saleh 2000) . 8 Unlike the I-O Tables, SESAME does identify non-cash labour income, as well as total wages and salaries. 1880-1974. 9 In addition, historical data for other countries suggest that these shares are likely to have been subject to significant annual fluctuations over time. The best possible solution here is to test the sensitivity of the results by assuming plausible factor income shares. In the next section, the paper uses labour income shares of 50% and 70%.
10
All data presented in this section are necessarily rough, given the difficulties in the compilation of statistical data in Indonesia in both past and present. These difficulties increase further back in time. Still, the data are based on the best possible available information and are reasonably robust. 8 The income data in the I-O Tables only comprise the sum of wages and salaries received, which is generally estimated on the basis of Sakernas. They do not include in-kind incomes, particularly the incomes of unpaid household workers. The income of the self-employed and of household-based ventures is included in the total operating surplus of all companies, which is not disaggregated. Sigit (2004: 103-104 ) solved this by multiplying average income of waged employees from Sakernas with the total number of gainfully employed, and expressing the total as a percentage of GDP. However, this yields lower labour income shares than in the SESAME tables. In addition, there is no correction for the fact that the definitions of income varied in the different Sakernas years (Sigit 2000b: 7-9 and 17-18) . 9 The 1975 share of 39% seems very low, but capital income comprised the imputed income from the productive use of land, most of which was owned by small farming households. In an economy where agriculture was the most important single sector in terms of employment and income, as was the case in Indonesia before the 1970s, income from land may have been relatively significant. 10 Which is roughly the band in which the labour income share in Spain fluctuated over time (Prados and Rosés 2007: Figure 8) . In the US, the labour income share was 65% during 1800-55 and 55% during 1855-90 (Abramovitz and David 2001: 20) , roughly the same as the UK and France in the late-19 th century (Prados and Rosés 2003: 50) .
The proximate sources of economic growth
The data in section 3 allow the disaggregation of GDP growth and the identification of the key proximate explanations of growth. Table 2 reveals the contribution of TFP growth to economic growth for key growth periods identified on the basis of Figure 1 . The table shows that TFP growth has on average been low during 1880-2007, explaining only 7 to 13% of the annual average 3.6% GDP growth. Most economic growth can be explained on the basis of the mobilisation of capital and labour, and improvements in the quality of labour, although the relative share of both key production factors in explaining growth depends on what their respective actual income shares were. Notably, during 1900-29, TFP growth was negative to marginal, despite the fact that this was a period during which the country must have experienced the impact of a range of potentially productivity-enhancing imported and home-grown technologies, as well as institutional changes. Arguably the most important technological changes were in transport and communications and in the production of key export commodities (Van der Eng 2002a: 153-54) . Together with the only 10 to 13% contribution of TFP growth during the high-growth era of 1967-97, this finding may be further evidence of the 'Solow Productivity Paradox'.
It should be noted, however, that these are averages for considerable periods, each of which may contain significant fluctuations in TFP growth. For that purpose, Figure 5 summarises the findings of this study in a different way. It expresses both measures of TFP growth as an annual index number. Given the break in the series during the 1940s, the chart uses two reference years (1880 and 1950). Better than Table 2, Figure 5 shows clearly that there were significant variations in annual TFP growth, particularly during 1900-29 and 1967-97. During 1900-29, TFP growth was positive 1923-28, but negative during most other years. Likewise during 1967-97, TFP growth was very high during 1967-73, but close to zero or negative during other years. Table 2 and Figure 5 revealed remarkably significant contributions of TFP growth to GDP growth during particularly four periods: 1933-41 (55-59% of 3.9% average annual growth), 1951-61 (58-59% of 4.3%), 1967-73 (66-67% of 9.4%) and 2000-07 (34% of 5.0%). What do the periods have in common? TFP and GDP growth during 1941-49 are not known, but it can be assumed that they were negative. If so, all four periods came after significant set-backs in Indonesia's economic development: the 1930-32 crisis, the 1942-49 Japanese occupation followed by the war of independence, the mounting political and economic chaos of the early 1960s, and the 1997-98 crisis. All four set-backs caused a slow-down in GFCF and in GFCS growth. Consequently, subsequent economic recovery was in first instance based on a more efficient use of productive resources, particularly capital stock, assisted by economic policy and institutional changes that enhanced productivity and efficiency.
Following 1930-32, the change took the form of import-replacing development strategies to off-set the consequences of falling commodity export earnings and later to prepare for the impact of World War II on Indonesia's foreign trade. This policy stance was interrupted during 1942-49, but intensified after the country's independence period, particularly in the face of falling commodity export earnings after the 1951-52 Korea boom. This period of expansion ended, however, when an accumulation of erratic policies under President Sukarno paralysed the economy during 1959-66. The regime change of 1966 eventually resulted in economic stabilisation and a phase of rapid economic growth during 1967-97 under President Soeharto, and significant TFP growth until GFCF took over as the main factor spurring economic growth during 1974-97. In each case, policy reforms took a few years to crystallise before their full impact was felt, and GFCF increased. Table 3 compares this paper's estimates of TFP growth and its contribution to economic growth in Indonesia with those of other studies. The table shows significant differences in the results of all studies, but particularly between those of studies 2-3 and 5-9 and those of Baier et al. (2006) , Sigit (2004 ), Firdausy (2005 and this study. Studies 1-9 hardly paid attention to the intricacies of Indonesia's statistical data and their consequences for growth accounting. It may therefore be appropriate to use their results with caution.
One of the reasons for the different results in Table 3 is the fact that authors often used different data sets and/or different ways to process the data, generally without regard for the inherent problems in the underlying data sets. For example, several of the multi-country studies obtained output data from the Penn World Tables  (PWT) , which in turn obtained them from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. However, there are many unexplained anomalies between the PWT data and the official data from BPS, Indonesia's statistical agency. For example, PWT gives total population estimates for Indonesia as 124.7 million in 1971, 154.4 million in 1980, 188.0 million in 1990 and 224.1 million in 2000, while Indonesia's population censuses give totals of respectively 118.4, 147.0, 178.5 and 206.2 million. PWT also offers GDP in international prices, even though Indonesia only featured twice -in 1980 and 1996 -in the six benchmarks of the International Comparisons Project. Hence, PWT estimated the key expenditure components of GDP for most years in its Indonesian time series on the basis of its multilateral 'shortcut approach', but without consideration of the degree of underestimation in Indonesia's national accounts data. In addition, several multi-country studies took capital stock data from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) , which were based on aggregated investment data obtained from the World Bank that took no account of underestimation, and on highly arbitrary assumptions, such as that of a single 'decay rate' of 4% for all countries. Baier et al. (2006) used Mitchell's handbooks of historical statistics as key sources, but without accounting for inconsistencies in e.g. the national accounts data, and simply interpolating years for which data were missing, without due account of the availability of other data for Indonesia.
Hence, it is difficult to check whether the different estimates of TFP growth from the multi-country studies are true differences or the consequences of measurement errors and/or the assumptions underlying data processing. For the same reason it is not possible to explain with detail the differences in the results of studies 1-9 and the findings of this paper. Only in the case of Sigit (2004) is it possible to explain the discrepancy, because Sigit clearly over-estimated capital stock growth, which was based on an incomplete and unpublished BPS estimate, while he also underestimated the share of labour income in total income by counting only wage income from Sakernas and excluding income in kind.
Several studies have estimated TFP on the basis of the firm-level data from the annual survey among industrial firms in Indonesia employing 20 or more people. The results are shown in Table 4 . They all suggest that in manufacturing industry TFP growth has been modest, but significant and positive.
To put the results of this paper in context, it has to be noted that the results in Table 2 do not necessarily indicate that there was no technological change in Indonesia that contributed to long-term economic growth. One of the key reasons for the different results shown in Table 3 is, as Chen (1997: 23-26) noted, the fundamental difficulty of measuring capital input, and the fact that TFP is consequently a fairly arbitrary concept. There are at least two fundamental problems with this paper's calculation of TFP growth: (1) it is estimated as a residual, and (2) the paper's calculation assumes perfect elasticity of substitution of labour and capital.
The measurement of TFP growth as a residual means that TFP does not account for the fact that some aspects of technological change may already have been captured in the measurement of capital stock and education-adjusted employment. As capital accumulation tends to be the main vehicle of technological change, much of the technology is embodied in the stock of capital goods. This fundamental issue is likely to be significant for Indonesia in recent decades, given the high rate of capital accumulation since the early 1980s, as Figure 2 showed. Hence, most of the current non-residential capital stock is of recent vintage, and is likely to embody recent technologies. In addition, in manufacturing industry, investment in machinery and equipment was predominant and sustained most of the rapid growth of output in that sector (Timmer 1999: 83 and 89) . While some technological change and efficiency gains were captured in the rates of TFP growth in manufacturing industry in Table 4 , other gains were most likely captured in the measured industrial capital stock, and cannot be disentangled.
11 On the other hand, as most investment outside manufacturing industry may have been in the form of non-residential structures,
11. See e.g. Maddison (1987: 663-664 ) for a discussion of the problem of technology embodiment in capital stock and the difficulty of accounting for it.
particularly investment in public infrastructure, the embodied efficiency gains may not have been as significant as was the case in manufacturing industry. Likewise, the measurement of education-augmented employment may have captured some technological change that would otherwise be measured as part of TFP. After all, the significant improvement in educational attainment explains one-third of the 28 to 31% contribution of employment to economic growth during 1967-97, shown in Table. Several of the studies in Table 3 did not adjust for changes in educational attainment. Hence, without the education adjustment, TFP growth in Table 2 would have been higher.
For those reasons, this paper's measure of TFP growth -and that of other studies as well -may be less a measure of technological change and increased efficiency of production than simply an unexplained residual that comprises a wide range of factors related to Indonesia's business environment as they impacted on the efficiency of production. Hence, low or negative TFP growth may rather reflect a multitude of inefficiencies in Indonesia's economy at large that impacted negatively on the productivity of firms rather than the general performance of firms. If TFP growth was indeed positive in manufacturing industry in recent decades, as Table 4 suggests, such inefficiencies may have existed in the non-manufacturing sectors of the economy. They may for example have taken the form of imperfections in particularly non-tradable sectors in non-manufacturing industry and services, such as transport and communications, and/or in labour, capital and commodity markets, possibly related to inhibiting regulations, the lack of exposure to foreign competition, the dominance of state-owned enterprises, and/or the presence of opportunities for anticompetitive behaviour.
A possible indication that TFP growth measures the residual is the fact that during 2000-07 the residual became positive, explaining a significant 34% of GDP growth. Of course, GFCF was relatively low during these years, while the growth of employment was steady. In addition, there may have been productive overcapacity by 1999 that became more efficiently used during 2000-07. Still, this change may be understood as an improvement in efficiency caused by the many growth-enhancing, or rather inefficiency-decreasing institutional changes that recent governments introduced in Indonesia (Van der Eng 2004). For example, deregulation and reregulation in various ways enhanced competition in previously non-tradable sectors. Likewise, new capital market regulation imposed greater discipline on listed firms. While these changes may have increased uncertainty among foreign investors about investing in Indonesia, they may at the same time have been an encouragement for firms in Indonesia with a more intimate knowledge of past and current idiosyncrasies and risk in Indonesia's business environment, and ways to hedge it.
Secondly, and related to the first point, available growth accounting studies implicitly assume that there is perfect elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. This paper did the same in equation (5). However, as Rodrik (1998: 84-8) has argued, it cannot be automatically assumed that this is the case. If, for example, economic growth and technological change had either a labour-saving or a capitalsaving nature, the elasticity of substitution would be more than, respectively less than 1.
12 Hence, if technological change in Indonesia was to a degree labour-saving and capital-absorbing, the process will have yielded a downward bias of the estimated rate of TFP growth. The bias may be in proportion to the capital-labour ratio, which indeed increased very significantly in Indonesia, as Figure 7 shows, particularly during 1988-97, and to a lesser degree during 1906-29 and 1970-87 . Although this point can be readily made, it is not easy to quantify its implications for efforts to account for economic growth.
Conclusion
This paper estimated that the contribution of TFP growth to GDP growth, after accounting for the growth of non-residential capital stock and education-adjusted employment, was on average a low 7 to 13% during 1880-2007. It also estimated that a large part of GDP growth during 127 years -44 to 61% -was explained by the growth of capital stock. During the 1967-97 period of rapid growth the growth of the capital stock still explained 56 to 61% of economic growth. As such, the case of Indonesia appears to offer support for Krugman's thesis that economic growth in East Asia in recent decades was 'perspiration', rather than 'inspiration'-based. However, the paper noted that capital stock in Indonesia is likely to have contained embodied technology, while the education-adjustment of employment is also likely to have captured part of the productivity growth that must have occurred, particularly during the key growth periods 1900-29 and 1967-97. Hence, the measure of residual TFP growth offered in the paper is more likely a reflection of a wide range of factors that impact on economic growth, but that the paper could not account for in ways done in other growth accounting studies. Such studies were generally able to draw on a much wider range of historical statistical data than are available for Indonesia (e.g. Maddison 1987; Crafts 2004) .
The negative residual TFP growth during 1900-29 and the marginally positive TFP growth during 1967-97 may be taken as reflections of a range of inefficiencies that existed in the Indonesian economy at the time, despite a range of other efficiencyenhancing technological and institutional changes that occurred at the same time. Support for that suggestion was found in the fact that TFP growth was significantly
12. An econometric approximation of factor shares during 1880-2007 supports the suggestion that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is imperfect. Linear multiple regression to estimate the coefficients in Equation (4) positive during 1933-41, 1951-61, 1967-73 and 2000-07 that each followed periods of economic recession or stagnation. During each of these periods, economic recovery may have been based in first instance on a more productive use of available resources, particularly capital stock. In second instance, recovery may have been based on the fact that preceding periods of recession or stagnation had magnified the economic inefficiencies that were then assessed, addressed and reduced, leading to economic policy and institutional changes that enhanced efficiency, leading successively to growth of GFCF that reduced measured TFP growth. Growth in East Asia ', Economic Record, 73: 201-11. Felipe, Jesus (1999) 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Note: Capital stock excludes residential structures. Sources: Van der Eng (2008b) ; main text and Tables A1 and A2. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Total (males + females) Males only Census years, total Census years, males Sakernas, total Sakernas, males
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Notes: (Intra) census years calculated by assuming that those reported as having 'incomplete primary education' had an average of 2 years of schooling, those with primary education 6 years of schooling, completed junior secondary education 9 years (6 years + 3 years for junior high school), senior secondary 11 years (6 + 3 + 2 years for senior high school) and tertiary education 15 years (6 + 3 + 2 + 4 years at university). Other estimates are derived from data on primary, secondary and tertiary education enrolments during 1870-2007. Student years were accumulated on the assumption that the working life of a primary school graduate was 50 years, that of a secondary school graduate 45 years, and of a university graduate 40 years. The series of accumulated education in terms of student years were divided by population. This procedure assumes that all enrolled students actually went to school during the year. It makes no adjustment for quality differences between the types of schooling or between public and private universities, nor does it take account of overseas education of Indonesian residents, or the education that migrants brought or took with them. Sources: 1961-80 census benchmarks Hugo et al. (1987 : 282), 1985 BPS (1987 : 123), 1990 BPS (1992 : 132), 1995 BPS (1996b : 138), 2000 BPS (2002 Figure 5: Change in Total Factor Productivity in Indonesia, 1880 -2007 (1880 =100, 1950 60 70 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Capital-employment ratio Capital-employment ratio (education-adjusted)
Source: Appendix A2. Baier et al. (2006: 45) 1951-2000 -0.7 -37 2. Bosworth et al. (1995 : Table A2) 1960-92 0.5 17 3. Collins and Bosworth (1996 : 157) 1960 -94 0.8 23 4. Firdausy (2005 1961-2000 -1.5 -27 5. Drysdale and Huang (1997: 208) 1962-90 2.1 31 6. Lindauer and Roemer (1994: 3) 1965-90 2.7 42 7. Young (1994: 243) 1970-85 1.2 24 8. Kawai (1994: 384) 1970-90 1.5 24 9. Sarel (1997: 29) 1978-96 1.2 25 10. Sigit (2004: 104-5) 1980-2000 -0.8 -15 11. This study a 0.6 12 a. Assuming 60% labour income share 1951-74, unlike the 50% and 70% in Table 2 . Note: The different results are due to differences in (a) the period considered, (b) the basic data used, (c) the ways in which the key variables for growth accounting were constructed, (d) variables used to account for growth.
Table 4: TFP Growth in Manufacturing Industry in Indonesia in Various Studies
Annual average % TFP contribution Study Period TFP growth (%) to output growth 1. Aswicayhono and Hill (2002: 148) 1975-93 2.7 21 2. Timmer (1999: 87-89) 1975-95 2.8 22 3. Vial (2006: 367) 1976 
